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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
EP MedSystems, Inc. appeals the dismissal with 
prejudice of its securities action against EchoCath, Inc. 
According to the complaint, the Chief Executive Officer of 
EchoCath enticed MedSystems into investing $1.4 million 
in EchoCath by assuring MedSystems that lengthy 
negotiations had already taken place with four prominent 
companies to market certain new EchoCath products and 
that contracts with these companies were "imminent." 
Relying on cautionary language contained in several public 
documents filed by EchoCath with the Securities Exchange 
Commission, the District Court held that these 
representations, as well as other r elated representations, 
were immaterial as a matter of law under the"bespeaks 
caution" doctrine and the general test for materiality. It also 
held that MedSystems failed to adequately plead scienter, 
reasonable reliance, and loss causation and could not do 
so. It accordingly dismissed the complaint without leave to 
amend. 
 
Our review of a decision granting a motion to dismiss is 
plenary. We must accept as true all the factual allegations 
in the complaint. See United States v. Gaubert , 499 U.S. 






The following facts are drawn largely fr om the amended 
complaint and the documents attached to the pleadings by 
the parties, including several EchoCath public filings with 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
EchoCath is a small New Jersey research and 
development company engaged in developing, 
manufacturing, and marketing medical devices to enhance 
and expand the use of ultrasound technology for medical 
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applications and procedures. Among the pr oducts that 
EchoCath has developed with the company's pr oprietary 
ultrasound technology are ColorMark, which highlights 
metallic objects such as needles and other interventional 
instruments in color to permit them to be seen on existing 
ultrasound imaging screens, and EchoMark, which 
electronically marks and displays the position of non- 
metallic objects such as catheters within the body. The 
parties refer to these two products as the"women's health 
products." EchoCath describes its women's health products 
as enabling physicians to perform pr ocedures such as 
needle biopsies, catheterizations, and intravascular imaging 
more safely and efficiently. 
 
EchoCath consummated its initial public offering on 
January 17, 1996 and issued a lengthy Prospectus that 
included details of the company's technologies, future 
plans, capitalization, collaborative agreements, and selected 
financial data. The Prospectus also included the caution 
that "[a]n investment in the securities of fered . . . is 
speculative in nature and involves a high degr ee of risk," 
App. at 81, and set forth several pages of risk factors. In 
particular, EchoCath cautioned investors that the company 
"intend[ed] to pursue licensing, joint development and other 
collaborative arrangements with other strategic partners 
. . . [but] [t]here can be no assurance . . . that the Company 
will be able to successfully reach agreements with any 
strategic partners, or that other strategic partners will ever 
devote sufficient resources to the Company's technologies." 
App. at 84. 
 
More than six months after the public of fering, 
MedSystems began consideration of a sizable investment in 
EchoCath. MedSystems is itself a small company involved 
in the development, marketing, and sales of car diac 
electrophysiology products used to diagnose and treat 
certain cardiac disorders. See Amended Complaint P 5. In 
August 1996, the chief executive officers of the two 
companies met at EchoCath's plant in Monmouth Junction, 
New Jersey, where MedSystems management tour ed 
EchoCath's facilities to evaluate the technology under 
development. See id. P 9. 
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Frank DeBernardis, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
EchoCath, made a lengthy presentation during the August 
meeting to David Jenkins, MedSystems President and CEO, 
James Caruso, its Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and 
Anthony Varrichio, a Director.See id. PP 9, 10. DeBernardis 
represented that EchoCath had engaged in lengthy 
negotiations to license its products and was on the verge of 
signing contracts with a number of prominent medical 
companies, which he identified as including Ur oHealth, 
Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, and C.R. Bar d, Inc., to 
develop and market EchoCath's women's health pr oducts. 
See id. 
 
Negotiations between MedSystems and EchoCath 
commenced "in earnest" in November 1996. See id. P 12. 
Throughout the negotiations and until the closing in 
February 1997, EchoCath's CEO continued to r epresent to 
MedSystems officials that EchoCath was actively moving 
forward with the line of women's health pr oducts described 
in the August meeting, see id., and that the contracts with 
UroHealth, Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic and C.R. Bard 
to develop these products were "imminent," see id. P 15. 
The complaint points to a specific telephone conversation 
between December 16 and December 20, 1996 during 
which EchoCath's CEO DeBernardis r eiterated these 
representations to the CFO of MedSystems. See id. P 12. 
 
On December 20, 1996, DeBernardis deliver ed a group of 
documents to MedSystems, which included the pr eviously 
issued 1996 EchoCath Prospectus and EchoCath'sfinancial 
projections and marketing plan for fiscal years 1997 and 
1998 entitled "EchoCath's Operating Model." See id. PP 13, 
14. The Operating Model "outline[d] the sales and 
marketing goals for the next two years (February 1996 - 
January 1998)." App. at 29. It projected sales from the 
women's health products of $852,000 in 1997 ($736,000 
for ColorMark and $116,000 for EchoMark) and $3,286,000 
in 1998 ($2.5 million for ColorMark and $786,000 for 
EchoMark) and represented that these sales projections 
were "conservative" estimates. App. at 19. The Operating 
Model contained the statements that the Model "is intended 
as a beginning guide, and it is expected that it will be 
revised," and it is "a simplified for m of accounting" but it 
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"does reflect accurately cash and incomeflows." App. at 19, 
29. The Operating Model included the statement that"[t]his 
Model is driven by a number of assumptions." App. at 19. 
 
The Operating Model also stated that EchoCath expected 
other income in 1996 and 1997, including $450,000 in the 
form of license fees and Milestone payments fr om 
Medtronic, arising out of a licensing agr eement EchoCath 
had with Medtronic for the use of leads with permanent 
pacemakers and defibrillators, a grant of $560,000 from the 
National Institute of Health, and $500,000 fr om another 
company interested in using the EchoMark technology. 
App. at 19. In the same paragraph, it noted that 
"[n]egotiations for these contracts ar e in process." App. at 
19. 
 
In an additional communication to MedSystems on 
December 23, 1996, this one by Daniel Mulvena, the Co- 
Chairman of EchoCath's Board, EchoCath stated that it 
anticipated that other outside investment in the company 
would provide sufficient operating funds to allow EchoCath 
to actively develop the women's health products for at least 
18 to 24 months. See Amended Complaint P 26. 
 
On February 27, 1997, MedSystems entered into a 
subscription agreement with EchoCath to pur chase 
280,000 shares of preferred EchoCath stock for 
$1,400,000. See id. P 8. In the agr eement, MedSystems 
specified that it "ha[d] not relied upon any representation or 
other information (oral or written) other than as contained 
in documents or answers to questions so furnished to 
[MedSystems] by [EchoCath]," that it had "relied on the 
advice of, or has consulted with, only its own Advisors," 
and acknowledged that "an investment in the Shar es 
involves a number of very significant risks and 
[MedSystems was] able to bear the loss of its entire 
investment." App. at 63. Nonetheless, MedSystems alleges 
in the complaint that it relied on the r epresentations from 
EchoCath's CEO of imminent contracts, the for ecasted 
sales, the expected fees and payments referr ed to in the 
Operating Model, and the assurance that EchoCath would 
have sufficient liquidity to continue operation for 18 to 24 
months. See Amended Complaint P 32. 
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In the fifteen months after MedSystems made its 
investment, EchoCath failed to enter into a single contract 
or to receive any income in connection with the marketing 
and development of the women's health products. It also 
did not receive the expected payments fr om license fees. 
See id. P 25. In September 1997, EchoCath advised 
MedSystems that EchoCath would run out of operating 
funds in 90 days if new investment in the company was not 
forthcoming. See id. P 27. 
 
MedSystems filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, alleging that EchoCath 
intentionally or recklessly made misrepr esentations to 
MedSystems in connection with the sale of securities in an 
effort to induce MedSystems to purchase its securities, in 
violation of Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j, and Rule 10b-5. See id. PP 30, 35. 
MedSystems also alleged a supplemental state law fraud 
claim. MedSystems alleged that EchoCath was not on the 
verge of signing contracts with any company to develop its 
line of women's health products in August of 1996, or any 
other time up to the closing on February 27, 1997. See id. 
P 17. MedSystems also alleged that EchoCath knew when it 
drew up the Operating Model that it was highly unlikely the 
company would meet the performance r equirements on 
which the Milestone payments were contingent. See id. 
P 22. It further alleged that EchoCath made this misleading 
projection in an effort to conceal EchoCath's true financial 
condition and to induce MedSystems to invest in the 
company. See id. P 23. 
 
EchoCath moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. It attached to its motion: (1) the January 17, 
1996 Prospectus; (2) the February 27, 1997 Subscription 
Agreement between EchoCath and MedSystems for the 
purchase of the stock; (3) its annual 10-KSB r eport filed 
with the SEC on December 12, 1996 for the 1996 fiscal 
year ending August 31, 1996 ("Annual Report"), which 
reported, inter alia, that as of August 31, 1996, EchoCath's 
operations had not generated significant r evenues and 
which contained substantial cautionary language; 1 (4) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Among the cautions contained in the Annual Report were statements 
that "[n]o assurance can be given that the Company will successfully 
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EchoCath's quarterly update filed with the SEC on January 
21, 1997 for the three months ending on November 30, 
1996 ("Quarterly Report"), which reported that EchoCath 
had minimal sales in the quarter, and that EchoCath "will 
receive a series of payments totaling $950,000[from its 
agreement with Medtronic] after the completion of certain 
milestones," that its current cash r eserves, together with 
anticipated sales, should be sufficient to fund r esearch and 
development and other capital needs through December 
1997, that it anticipated additional cash resources that 
would be provided by the completion of unspecified 
licensing agreements and strategic alliances, but that there 
"can be no assurances that the Company will be able to 
complete the aforementioned license agr eements and 
strategic alliances on acceptable terms." App. at 214-15. 
EchoCath took the position that these documents 
established that any alleged misrepresentations were 
immaterial under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine because 
they contained sufficient cautionary language. 
 
The District Court concluded as an initial matter that it 
was appropriate to examine these documents without 
transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment, as they were expressly or implicitly 
relied upon by MedSystems in its complaint. EP 
MedSystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 30 F . Supp. 2d 726, 
741-42 (D.N.J. 1998). Although the complaint contains no 
direct reference to the Annual Report or the Quarterly 
Report, MedSystems does not contest that decision. There 
is no indication that MedSystems ever received a copy of 
these documents, but they were readily available to the 
public. 
 
The District Court then dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice. In an exhaustive and lengthy opinion, the court 
concluded that the representations wer e immaterial as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
commercialize any of its products or achieve profitable operations," that 
the report contained "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and that many 
known and unknown risks may cause the actual r esults to be materially 
different from the company's futur e predictions. App. at 157-58. 
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matter of law under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine 
because of the cautionary language accompanying these 
alleged misrepresentations. See id.  at 745-51, 760-69. The 
court also stated that MedSystems had failed to plead 
scienter with sufficient particularity as r equired by Rule 
9(b) and 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(b)(2). See id.  at 751-56. Next, 
the court found that MedSystems could not have 
reasonably relied on EchoCath's optimisticfinancial 
projections. See id. at 757-60. Finally, the court concluded 
that MedSystems failed to plead loss causation. See id. at 
769-71. Having dismissed the federal securities claim, the 
District Court declined to retain jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law fraud claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c)(3). See id. at 771-72. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal 
securities claim under 15 U.S.C. SS 77v and 78aa and the 
state fraud claim under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(a). W e have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. W e exercise plenary 
review over the District Court's dismissal of MedSystems' 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Wheeler v. T owanda 






Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act pr ovides 
that it is unlawful for any person to "use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). Rule 10b-5 
makes it unlawful for a person to "make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading . . . in connection with the pur chase or sale 
of any security." 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5(b). Together, these 
provisions establish a private right of action for plaintiffs to 
recover for false or misleading statements or omissions of 
material fact. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 
525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Under the legal principles governing actions alleging 
securities fraud, MedSystems must prove that EchoCath (1) 
made misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with 
scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities; (4) upon which MedSystems relied; and (5) that 
MedSystems' reliance was the proximate cause of its injury. 
See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F .3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 
1997). The District Court relied on these principles, and the 
precedents applying them, in dismissing MedSystems' 
complaint as a matter of law. 
 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that there are 
important distinctions between this case and the usual 
securities actions for which these principles wer e 
developed. Although EchoCath, like the companies sued in 
those cases, sought to sell its securities in the market by 
an offering accompanied by the January 1996 Pr ospectus, 
MedSystems does not base its claim on public 
misrepresentations or omissions that af fected the price of 
the stock it purchased. Instead, it contends that it was 
induced to make the substantial $1.4 million investment as 
a result of personal representations directly made to its 
executives by EchoCath's executives and that those 
representations were false and misleading. 
 
In one sense, this action is more akin to a contract action 
than a securities action, and that may be the claim 
encompassed in its state law fraud count that the District 
Court did not consider. However, as MedSystems chose to 
base its initial claim on the securities law, we cannot fault 
the District Court for analyzing it as such. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between the fact pattern alleged here and that 
in the typical securities cases explains why it is difficult to 
apply the precedent from those cases to many of the issues. 
It is like the proverbial difficulty of fitting a square peg in 
a round hole. While the question whether EchoCath's 
alleged misrepresentations are immaterial as a matter of 
law can be readily considered under the pr ecedent, it is far 
more difficult to do so with the subsequent issues, such as 
whether MedSystems pled scienter with sufficient 
particularity, failed to plead reasonable r eliance, and failed 
to plead loss causation. We consider each of these issues 
hereafter, keeping in mind throughout not only this 
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distinction but also that the District Court dismissed the 




General Principles of Materiality 
 
That materiality is a prerequisite to a viable securities 
action based on a misrepresentation is too well established 
to require citation. Nor can there be any disagreement as to 
the general definition of materiality under the securities 
laws. As the Supreme Court has defined it, a 
misrepresentation or omitted fact "is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shar eholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to [act]." TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
Although the TSC Industries case involved a proxy 
solicitation dispute, the TSC Industries standard of 
materiality was expressly applied by the Court to the S 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 context in Basic Inc. v. Levinson , 485 U.S. 
224, 232 (1988). According to the Court, for a 
misrepresentation or omission to be material " `there must 
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosur e of the 
omitted fact [or misrepresentation] would have been viewed 
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the `total mix' of information made available.' " Id. at 231-32 
(quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449). 
 
Material representations must be contrasted with 
statements of subjective analysis or extrapolations, such as 
opinions, motives and intentions, or general statements of 
optimism, which " `constitute no mor e than `puffery' and are 
understood by reasonable investors as such.' " In re 
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 538 (quoting In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F .3d 1410, 1428 
n.14 (3d Cir. 1997)). In other words, some statements 
would not alter the total mix of relevant infor mation 
available to a reasonable investor. W e have recognized that 
"[a]lthough questions of materiality have traditionally been 
viewed as particularly appropriate for the trier of fact, 
complaints alleging securities fraud often contain claims of 
omissions or misstatements that are obviously so 
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unimportant that courts can rule them immaterial as a 
matter of law at the pleading stage." In r e Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426. 
 
The materiality requirement has been further refined in 
recent years. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "Reform Act") because 
of significant evidence of abuse in private securities 
litigation, particularly the filing of frivolous suits alleging 
securities violations designed solely to coer ce companies to 
settle quickly and avoid the expense of litigation. See S. 
Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 
(1990), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730. The 
Reform Act contains, inter alia, a statutory safe harbor for 
forward-looking written or oral statements. 2 Under that 
provision, an issuer is not liable for a forwar d-looking 
statement if it is "identified as a forwar d-looking statement, 
and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements 
identifying important factors that could cause actual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Act defines "forward-looking statement" to include: 
 
       (A) a statement containing a projection of r evenues, income 
       (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per 
share, 
       capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other 
financial 
       items; 
 
       (B) a statement of the plans and objectives of man agement for 
       future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the 
       products or services of the issuer; 
 
       (C) a statement of future economic per formance, including any such 
       statement contained in a discussion and analysis offinancial 
       condition by the management or in the results of operations 
       included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
 
       (D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or  relating to any 
       statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); 
 
       (E) any report issued by an outside r eviewer retained by an 
issuer, 
       to the extent that the report assesses a forwar d-looking statement 
       made by the issuer; or 
 
       (F) a statement containing a projection or es timate of such other 
       items as may be specified by rule or regulation of the Commission. 
 
15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-5(i)(1) (West Supp. 2000). 
                                 11 
  
results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking 
statement." 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 
2000). The safe harbor is also available for oral forward- 
looking statements under certain conditions.3 
 
In this case, the District Court did not rely on, nor did 
EchoCath cite, the safe harbor provision as a basis for 
finding the representations at issue immaterial as a matter 
of law. This may be because the oral misrepr esentations on 
which MedSystems brought suit were not identified as 
forward-looking as required by the safe harbor provision. 
See supra note 3. Instead, the District Court found that the 
misrepresentations were immaterial under the "bespeaks 
caution" doctrine as adopted by this court in In re Donald 
J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, "cautionary 
language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or 
misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law." Id. at 
371. In In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., we held that a suit 
brought by a class of investors who pur chased bonds to 
provide funding for the acquisition and completion of the 
Taj Mahal, a lavish casino/hotel on the boar dwalk of 
Atlantic City, could not be maintained because the alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions in the pr ospectus were 
accompanied by warning signals in the text of the 
prospectus that conveyed to potential investors the extreme 
risks inherent in the venture and the variety of obstacles 
the venture would face. See id. at 364. We stated that 
"bespeaks caution" represents new nomenclature, but it "is 
essentially shorthand for the well-established principle that 
a statement or omission must be considered in context, so 
that accompanying statements may render it immaterial as 
a matter of law." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Under the Reform Act, an issuer is not liable for any oral forward- 
looking statements if (1) the issuer informs the audience that the 
statement is forward-looking and that actual r esults may differ 
materially from the predictions; (2) the issuer orally directs the 
audience 
to other "readily available" written documents that contain the additional 
information about important factors relating to the forward-looking 
statement; and (3) the identified documents set forth satisfactory 
cautionary statements. See 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-5(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 
2000). 
 
                                12 
  
Shortly thereafter, in Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., 
Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994), we considered application 
of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine to alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions in an opinion letter 
written by a law firm to its client. W e rejected the position 
that the disclaimers in the opinion letter entitled the law 
firm to summary judgment. As we stated,"[n]ot just any 
cautionary language will trigger application of the doctrine. 
Instead, disclaimers must relate directly to that on which 
investors claim to have relied." Id. at 489. Quoting In re 
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., we recognized that: 
 
       [A] vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which 
       merely warns the reader that the investment has 
       risks will ordinarily be inadequate to pr event 
       misinformation. To suffice, the cautionary statements 
       must be substantive and tailored to the specific future 
       projections, estimates or opinions in the pr ospectus 




Later, in In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we reversed the dismissal of a suit based on 
alleged misstatements in Westinghouse's 1991 Prospectus. 
The district court had held that the cautionary language in 
the prospectus rendered the alleged misstatements 
immaterial under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. See id. 
at 707. We held that "notwithstanding the cautionary 
language" in the prospectus, the alleged misrepresentations 
about the adequacy of the loan loss reserves likely "would 
have assumed actual significance to a reasonable investor 
contemplating the purchase of securities." Id. at 710. 
 
By its terms, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, like the 
safe harbor provision in the Reform Act, is directed only to 
forward-looking statements. When we first r ecognized the 
doctrine, we stated that "when an offering document's 
forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements, the forwar d-looking 
statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud 
claim . . . ." In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d at 371 
(emphasis added). In later cases, we confir med that the 
doctrine only applied to forward-looking statements. See, 
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e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the plaintiffs"maintain that the 
`bespeaks caution' doctrine is inapplicable, because the 
statements related to present and historical facts that were 
capable of verification and, as such, not forwar d-looking" 
whereas "[t]he defendants . . . characterize the statements 
. . . as forward-looking, and thus subject to the bespeaks 
caution doctrine."). 
 
The other courts of appeals have also held that the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine only applies to forward-looking 
statements. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc. , 120 F.3d 1112, 
1123 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding "bespeaks caution" doctrine 
inapplicable to alleged statements relating to the company's 
increased market share, pace of mer ger integration, and 
"smooth" merger); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 
1408 (9th Cir. 1996) ("By definition, the bespeaks caution 
doctrine applies only to affirmative, forwar d-looking 
statements."); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp. , 82 F.3d 1194, 
1213 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that a statement may 
contain "both a forward-looking aspect and an aspect that 
encompasses a representation of pr esent fact," and "[t]o the 
extent that plaintiffs allege that the . . . statement 
encompasses the latter representation of present fact, and 
that such a representation was false or misleading when 
made, the surrounding cautionary language could not have 
rendered the statement immaterial as a matter of law.") 
(emphasis omitted); Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 
Inc., 65 F.3d 1392, 1405-06 (7th Cir . 1995) (refusing to 
apply "bespeaks caution" doctrine to statement of "hard 
fact" regarding the company's "plans to restore profitability 
to its day-to-day operations"); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 
160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the"bespeaks caution" 
doctrine's applicability to "predictive statements"). But cf. 
Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 805-06 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that statements made on the last day of a quarter 
concerning the results for the quarter ar e forward-looking). 
 
We have also recognized that for the"bespeaks caution" 
doctrine to apply, the cautionary language must be directly 
related to the alleged misrepresentations or omissions. See 
Kline, 24 F.3d at 489. Although we have never explicitly 
held that the cautionary language must actually 
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accompany the alleged misrepresentation or omission, we 
have noted in many cases that the cautionary language did 
accompany the representation. For example, in In re Trump 
Casino Sec. Litig., we evaluated the plaintif fs' "assertion 
that the Partnership believed the Taj Mahal could meet the 
obligations of the bonds [set forth in the pr ospectus], [and] 
also other relevant statements contained in the 
prospectus." 7 F.3d at 369. W e noted that "an 
accompanying statement may neutralize the ef fect of a 
misleading statement." Id. at 372. 
 
In Kline, we pointed out that the opinion letters at issue 
contained cautionary language but ultimately concluded 
that the disclaimer did not directly relate to the statements 
by which plaintiffs claimed to have been misled, and thus 
we concluded the claim could be maintained. See  24 F.3d 
at 489-90. Similarly, in In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., even 
though the cautionary language appeared in the 
prospectus, we held that it did not sufficiently negate some 
of the claims. See 90 F.3d at 709. 
 
EchoCath argues that the cautionary language need not 
accompany the alleged misrepresentation, citing to our 
decision in Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310 (3d 
Cir. 1997). One of the alleged misrepr esentations was the 
statement made by the CEO of Quaker Oats at a public 
meeting on August 4, 1994 that he was "confident of 
achieving at least 7% real earnings gr owth" in fiscal year 
1995. Id. at 313. The district court dismissed this claim, 
ruling that the projections of earnings growth were per se 
reasonable and per se immaterial. Although we affirmed the 
dismissal of this claim, we did so only after finding that a 
subsequent statement in the 1994 Annual Report that the 
company is "committed to achieving a real earnings growth 
of at least 7 percent over time" neutralized the alleged oral 
misrepresentation. Id. at 321 (emphasis in original). The 
phrase "over time" inoculated Quaker Oats fr om any claims 
of fraud based on a decline in earnings gr owth. 
 
EchoCath seeks to draw from Weiner  the general 
proposition that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applies if 
the cautionary language in public filings addr esses the 
substance of the alleged misrepresentations and provokes 
uncertainty, even if the cautionary language does not 
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accompany or directly negate the misrepr esentations. 
Weiner cannot stand for that proposition because we 
specifically noted that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine was 
only applicable if the forecasts, opinions and projections 
were accompanied by a meaningful cautionary statement, 
and the August 4 statement "was accompanied by no such 
language." See id. at 320. Instead, we held that the 
earnings growth projection was immaterial as a matter of 
law under the general test for materiality because after 
issuance of the Annual Report with its "over time" 
language, "[n]o reasonably careful investor would find 
material a prediction of seven-percent gr owth followed by 
the qualifier `over time.' " Id. at 321. 
 
Notwithstanding our precedent suggesting that the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine requir es the cautionary 
language to accompany the misrepresentation, we need not 
make such a holding today. Ultimately, this court may 
recognize such a requirement, but we choose to exercise 
restraint in that connection because we r ecognize that 
possible fact scenarios may arise that we cannot now 
envision. See Grossman, 120 F .3d at 1122 (rejecting notion 
that cautionary language must accompany the 
representation at issue). 
 
Nonetheless, the absence of accompanying cautionary 
language is an important factor in determining the 
materiality of the misrepresentation. If the representation is 
so obviously unimportant to an investor that r easonable 
minds could not differ on the question of materiality, the 
representation or omission will be immaterial as a matter of 
law. See Weiner, 129 F.3d at 321. On the other hand, 
"[m]ateriality is a mixed question of law and fact, and the 
delicate assessments of the inferences a r easonable 
shareholder would draw from a given set of facts are 
peculiarly for the trier of fact." Shapir o v. UJB Financial 
Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 280 n. 11 (3d Cir . 1992). We turn to 
consideration of the misrepresentations alleged by 
MedSystems in light of these general principles to 
determine if dismissal at the pleading stage should be 
upheld. 
 






1. "Imminent Contracts" 
 
The principal allegation of MedSystems is that EchoCath 
repeatedly misrepresented the existence of imminent 
contracts for its women's health products. The complaint 
alleges that EchoCath's CEO represented that it "had 
engaged in lengthy negotiations with and was on the verge 
of signing contracts with a number of companies including 
UroHealth, Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic and C.R. Bard, 
Inc. to develop and market [EchoCath's] women's health 
products." Amended Complaint P 10; see also id. PP 12, 13, 
15, 17. MedSystems also alleges that "[t]hr oughout the 
negotiations and until the closing in February, 1997," 
EchoCath "continued to represent . . . that EchoCath was 
actively moving forward with the line of women's health 
products . . . ." Id. P 12. Allegedly, EchoCath's CEO 
repeated these assurances to MedSystems' CFO during a 
telephone conversation between December 16 and 
December 20, 1996 and again on December 20 when 
MedSystems was given the Operating Model. See id. PP 12- 
14. On or about January 30, 1997, EchoCath's CEO 
further assured MedSystems that "the deals he had 
promised with outside companies to develop these products 
were imminent." Id. P 15. 
 
The District Court, referring to this claim as the Possible 
Contracts Allegation, concluded that this repr esentation 
was immaterial as a matter of law under both the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine and the general test of 
materiality.4 Applying the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the 
court assumed that the imminent contracts repr esentation 
was forward-looking but never explicitly deter mined that it 
was. In addition, the court found that the documents 
containing the cautionary language were "for the most 
part contemporaneous" with the imminent contracts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that the District Court discussed the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine under its section on reliance, see EP MedSystems, 30 F. Supp. 
2d at 760, though the doctrine actually concer ns materiality. 
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representation. EP MedSystems, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 767. It 
later stated that cautionary language neutralized the 
alleged misrepresentation "[i]rr espective of the time of 
issuance of the [documents]." Id. at 769. 
 
As we noted earlier, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine 
applies only to forward-looking statements. On review, we 
cannot say as a matter of law that the repr esentation was 
not a present statement of fact. EchoCath's CEO had told 
MedSystems that lengthy negotiations with the four 
companies had already taken place and that the contracts 
were "imminent." See Amended Complaint P 15. An event is 
"imminent" if it is "ready to take place." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONAR Y 1130 (1976). A statement by the 
CEO of EchoCath that contracts with four companies were 
"ready to take place" may reasonably be construed as a 
representation about the current state of negotiations 
between EchoCath and the four companies it had 
identified. As such, the representation could be reasonably 
construed by a trier of fact to be a statement of fact rather 
than a prediction of future events. 
 
This view is consistent with that of other cir cuits. See, 
e.g., Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1123 (concluding that the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine would not apply because the 
statements at issue contained "then-present factual 
conditions, or implied background factual assumptions a 
reasonable investor would regard the speaker as believing 
to be true."); Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1212-13 (finding a statement 
that the company's reserves were adequate to cover costs 
contained both "forward-looking" and"present-oriented" 
aspects and was therefore not subject to the "bespeaks 
caution" doctrine); Harden, 65 F .3d at 1405-06 
(determining that a statement regar ding the company's 
"plans" to restore profitability was "a present assertion of 
fact, i.e., `plans' exist or are being for mulated"). 
 
There is also a question whether the cautionary language 
cited by the District Court was sufficiently pr oximate to the 
imminent contracts representations to meet the relatedness 
test established by our precedent. The r epresentations were 
not accompanied by any cautionary language. The 
cautionary language referred to by the District Court to 
have put MedSystems on notice that the contracts might 
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never be consummated was contained in the 1996 
Prospectus, published in January 1996 in connection with 
the initial public offering and given to MedSystems in 
December 1996. That Prospectus had numer ous cautionary 
warnings regarding the futur e of EchoCath.5 
 
However, the 1996 Prospectus was published seven 
months before the August 1996 meeting wher e EchoCath's 
CEO first made the representation that it was "on the verge 
of signing contracts" with the four companies. By the time 
EchoCath gave the Prospectus to MedSystems, over ten 
months had passed since its initial publication. W e cannot 
discount the possibility that MedSystems executives would 
have treated the cautionary language as applicable to the 
earlier date when the Prospectus was issued. Whatever the 
state of the negotiations between EchoCath and the four 
companies when the Prospectus was published in January 
1996, the MedSystems executives might have r easonably 
believed that significant progress in the negotiations had 
been made in the interim. This may be particularly so when 
EchoCath's CEO has personally and repeatedly given 
assurances that four contracts were "imminent." 
 
The District Court found the necessary relatedness 
because the Prospectus contained repr esentations similar 
to those made by EchoCath's CEO in the August 1996 
meeting. See EP MedSystems, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 747-48. 
However, the Prospectus contained general language of 
intentions to make arrangements and agreements with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. For example, the Prospectus includes the following: 
 
       [EchoCath] has no binding commitments fr om any third parties to 
       provide funds to [EchoCath] . . . [and] there can be no assurance 
       that [EchoCath] will be able to obtain financing from any other 
       sources on acceptable terms. App. at 99. 
 
       [EchoCath] intends to pursue licensing, joint development and other 
       collaborative arrangements with other strategic partners. There can 
       be no assurance, however, that [EchoCath] will be able to 
       successfully reach agreements with any strategic partners, or that 
       other strategic partners will ever devote sufficient resources to 
       [EchoCath's] technologies. App. at 84. 
 
       No assurance can be given that [EchoCath] will ever be able to 
       establish commercial scale manufacturing operations. App. at 84. 
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third parties. Nothing in the Prospectus specifically refers 
to the imminent contracts with the four companies 
EchoCath identified in August 1996. 
 
The District Court also cited to cautionary language 
contained in EchoCath's Annual Report for the fiscal year 
ending August 31, 1996 and the Quarterly Report for the 
quarter ending November 30, 1996, which both cautioned 
investors that there could be no assurance that EchoCath 
would ever successfully commercialize any of its products 
or complete any of the expected license agreements or 
strategic alliances on acceptable terms. The Annual Report 
was filed with the SEC on December 12, 1996 and pr ovided 
information as of August 31, 1996, and the Quarterly 
Report was filed on January 21, 1997 and pr ovided 
information as of November 30, 1996. Whether they were 
sufficient to neutralize the initial repr esentation of the four 
imminent contracts made in the August 1996 meeting is 
not so obvious as to be decided as a matter of law. 
Moreover, MedSystems also alleged that EchoCath's CEO 
repeated his assurance that the four contracts were 
imminent between November 1996, when the parties began 
negotiations for the subscription agreement, and February 
1997, when the subscription agreement was finally closed. 
See Amended Complaint P 12. Ther efore, we cannot agree 
with the District Court that the cautionary language 
contained in these documents rendered the imminent 
contracts representation immaterial under the "bespeaks 
caution" doctrine. 
 
Nor do we agree that dismissal of the complaint should 
be affirmed under the general test for materiality. The 
District Court justified dismissal of the imminent contracts 
claim because "[a]bsent a statement by EchoCath that the 
contracts would be consummated, such statements, taken 
in context, are not false and misleading," EP MedSystems, 
30 F. Supp. 2d at 748, and cited as support our decision in 
Weiner. The District Court also held that the 1996 
Prospectus put MedSystems on notice of the possibility that 
the four contracts might not be consummated. Ther efore, 
according to the court, no reasonable sophisticated investor 
would view such representations as altering the total mix of 
information. 
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We find little support in Weiner  where, as discussed 
above, the claim that was dismissed was based on a public 
statement of earnings growth projections that was followed 
by an equally public qualifier. Her e, MedSystems bases its 
claim on oral representations personally made by 
EchoCath's CEO to executives of MedSystems fr om August 
1996 until its subscription was finalized in February 1997, 
a qualitatively different situation. A r easonable investor 
could have viewed these representations as altering the 
total mix of information. 
 
EchoCath argues that even if MedSystems executives 
believed that the contracts were imminent in August of 
1996, they should have known by February 1997 when the 
contracts had not been consummated that they could not 
rely on the veracity of the representation. See Br. of 
Appellee at 4. On the other hand, MedSystems had r eceived 
no information from EchoCath during that period to 
suggest that the contracts would not be consummated. 
Thus, MedSystems could have reasonably consider ed that 
there was no change in the information on which the 
representation was based, inasmuch as EchoCath, which 
was in a superior position than was MedSystems to 
ascertain the facts, failed to update its earlier 
representations. See Weiner, 129 F.3d at 318. 
 
It follows that we cannot agree with the District Court 
and EchoCath that the imminent contracts repr esentation 
is immaterial as a matter of law. 
 
2. Sales Projections 
 
The MedSystems complaint states that DeBernar dis, 
EchoCath's CEO, made representations to MedSystems 
concerning anticipated income from the"women's health 
products it had always represented it was committed to 
marketing and developing." Amended ComplaintP 14. 
These representations were contained in the Operating 
Model for the fiscal years 1997 and 1998, which EchoCath 
delivered to MedSystems in December 1996. Specifically, 
the Operating Model states: "ColorMark sales ar e projected 
to be $736,000 in the coming year and $2.5 million in the 
second year. The EchoMark SSG catheter sales are 
projected at $116,000 and $786,000 in the 1st and 2nd 
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year, respectively. We believe these sales projections are 
conservative." App. at 19. 
 
The District Court discussed the sales projections along 
with the imminent contracts representation, apparently 
recognizing that the projections would necessarily be based 
on the consummation of the contracts for the women's 
health products. We agree with this approach. Ordinarily, 
sales projections such as these are characterized as 
forward-looking statements that may fall within the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine. See In r e Advanta Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 180 F.3d at 536. In fact, the pr ojections were 
accompanied by a number of warnings. The Operating 
Model stated at the outset that "[t]his Model is driven by a 
number of assumptions," and warned that"[t]his Model is 
a simplified form of accounting, but does r eflect accurately 
cash and income flows." App. at 19. It further stated that 
the sales and marketing goals outlined were"intended as a 
beginning guide, and it is expected that [they] will be 
revised." App. at 29. Such statements could be sufficient to 
neutralize the materiality of the sales projections in the 
same document. 
 
However, we do not understand MedSystems to be 
arguing that its claim can be maintained on the basis of the 
sales projections independent of the imminent contracts 
representation. At oral argument, its counsel stated that 
the sales projections and financial model wer e tied into the 
representation that these contracts wer e imminent. He 
further conceded that the sales projections tur n on the 
validity of that representation and that the imminent 
contracts representation is by far the most important 
misrepresentation in this case. Ther efore, we are not 
prepared to hold that the sales pr ojections are completely 
immaterial at this pleading stage of the proceeding, as they 




6. Because the sales projections are not an independent basis for the 
action, we need not consider whether they would be actionable under 
our language in Weiner, where we declined to recognize a per se rule of 
immateriality for earnings growth projections. See 129 F.3d at 320 n.12. 
We noted that a per se rule would immunize companies from "the need 
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3. Milestone Payment and Other Licensing Receipts 
 
MedSystems also alleged that EchoCath's Operating 
Model misrepresented the likelihood that it would receive 
$450,000 in "Milestone payments" under its r ecent contract 
with Medtronic, and $500,000 from a company that wished 
to use EchoMark technology for "guiding pr ostrate 
treatments." Amended Complaint PP 22, 24. Like the 
imminent contracts, none of the payments eventuated. 
However, unlike the imminent contracts r epresentation 
which was made by the CEO of EchoCath personally to 
MedSystems executives on various occasions, the 
statements regarding the expected r eceipts cannot be 
viewed as statements of present fact but rather are forward- 
looking. The Operating Model described the Milestone 
payment and other licensing fees as "[o]ther income over 
the coming two-year period." App. at 19 (emphasis added). 
The statement is thus akin to the "over time" statement in 
Weiner which neutralized an earnings growth projection. 
See 129 F.3d at 321. Indeed, the qualifying language 
accompanied the representation and we see no reason why 
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine would be inapplicable. The 
District Court did not err in holding these statements to be 
immaterial. 
 
4. Sufficiency of Funds 
 
The final misrepresentation alleged in the complaint 
concerns the statement made on December 23, 1996 by the 
Co-Chairman of EchoCath's Board to r epresentatives of 
MedSystems that the investment by MedSystems together 
with "other outside investments" would pr ovide EchoCath 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to speak truthfully about the future." Id.; see also Kline, 24 F.3d at 486 
(stating that opinions are actionable under federal securities law if made 
without a reasonable genuine belief or factual basis); Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir . 1985) ("opinion must not be made 
with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity") (quotation omitted). 
MedSystems did allege that EchoCath "did not genuinely believe and 
ha[s] no reasonable basis to support the projections set forth" in its 
Operating Model, an allegation that, if proven, will be equally relevant 
to 
the representation about the imminence of the contracts upon which 
this case is based. Amended Complaint P 18. 
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with sufficient operating funds to allow it to actively develop 
and market the products for at least 18 to 24 months. 
Amended Complaint P 26. The District Court concluded 
that this statement was neither misleading nor material 
when examined in light of cautionary language surr ounding 
a similar statement in the January 1996 Prospectus. See 
EP MedSystems, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 751. But nearly a year 
had passed from issuance of the Prospectus until the 
representation at issue, which would likely have negated 
whatever effect might be attributable to the cautionary 
language in the Prospectus. MedSystems executives could 
have reasonably believed that new developments had 
occurred that prompted the Co-Chair man to make that oral 
representation. 
 
However, we agree with the District Court's conclusion 
that the representation is not material. As alleged, the 
representation was of "anticipated" investment in EchoCath 
-- not guaranteed. Amended Complaint P 26. Unlike the 
imminent contracts representation, the Co-Chairman's 
statements did not refer to specific companies (besides 
MedSystems itself). Nor was this representation repeated 
over a six-month period. MedSystems was well awar e that 
it was dealing with a start-up company and should have 
expected that cash flow would be an issue. No r easonable 
investor could find that one optimistic statement made by 
the company's board member affects the total mix of 
information available to that investor . Therefore, the 
claimed misrepresentation relating to anticipated 
sufficiency of funds is immaterial. 
 
To summarize, in applying the materiality principle to the 
alleged misrepresentations, we conclude that the imminent 
contracts representation as well as the r elated sales 
projection do not fall within the "bespeaks caution" doctrine 
as the District Court held but that they may be viewed by 
a factfinder as statements of present fact. Therefore, they 
may not be dismissed as immaterial as a matter of law. On 
the other hand, the District Court did not err in dismissing 
the claims regarding the expected r eceipts from other 
contracts and the anticipated sufficiency of funds, although 
our analysis differs to some extent fr om the District 
Court's. 
 






EchoCath argues on appeal that the District Court 
correctly held that dismissal of the complaint was also 
warranted on the ground that MedSystems failed to meet 
the heightened pleading required for the scienter element in 
securities fraud cases. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which applies to all complaints filed in 
federal court, provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The 
1995 Reform Act requires, inter alia, that a "complaint 
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate 
[the Securities Exchange Act], state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(2) 
(West Supp. 2000). After considering these r equirements, 
we recently held that it "remains sufficient for plaintiffs [to] 
plead scienter by alleging facts `establishing a motive and 
an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting forth facts 
that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or 
conscious behavior.' " In r e Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 
F.3d at 534-35 (quoting Weiner, 129 F.3d at 318 n.8). 
 
The District Court read our decision in In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, to hold that we must 
analyze the allegations of the complaint separately rather 
than in their totality. We need not decide how In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig. would apply her e. Our earlier 
conclusion that the representations as to expected receipts 
from other contracts and the representation as to the 
anticipated sufficiency of funds are immaterial obviates any 
need to consider whether these allegations meet the 
standard for pleading scienter. It follows that we need only 
analyze the sufficiency of the pleading as to the 
representation of the imminence of the contracts with four 
identified companies and the related sales pr ojections. 
 
MedSystems' complaint alleges that "[c]ontrary to 
EchoCath's repeated representations to EP MedSystems, 
EchoCath was not on the verge of signing contracts with 
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UroHealth, Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, C.R. Bard, Inc. 
or any other company to market and develop a line of 
women's health products in September, 1996 or at any 
other time up to the closing of February 27, 1997." 
Amended Complaint P 17. Moreover,"EchoCath knew at all 
times relevant hereto that it had no r easonable prospects of 
entering into the contracts it had identified to EP 
MedSystems." Id. P 18. The complaint then notes that 
"EchoCath has failed to entered [sic] in to a single contract 
and has yet to receive any income fr om the sale of women's 
health products" since September 1996. Id. P 19 (emphasis 
in original). 
 
MedSystems argues that these allegations constitute 
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness. The District Court, on the other hand, viewed 
the complaint as merely alleging fraud by hindsight. It is, of 
course, true that we generally require mor e than a showing 
that a predicted event did not occur in or der to sustain a 
claim of fraud. See In re Advanta Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 
536-37. And in In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d at 1429, we stated that it is not enough for a plaintiff 
to state that defendants had no reasonable basis for 
making the representation. However , we believe that when 
multiple promised events fail to occur, there is a point 
where a strong inference of fraud can be made. As 
MedSystems notes, four contracts with independent 
companies, each characterized as imminent, failed to 
materialize within a year of the representations. While it is 
possible that all of these companies discover ed some 
characteristic of EchoCath or its products that explained 
why the putative contracts did not materialize, we cannot 
dismiss the possibility that EchoCath, in an ef fort to coax 
a substantial investment, did not fairly repr esent to 
MedSystems the status of its negotiations with these 
companies. 
 
As we noted earlier, this case presents a factual situation 
unlike that in our prior precedent and, indeed, unlike those 
that were the basis for the 1995 Reform Act. The legislative 
history of the Reform Act makes clear that it was primarily 
directed at the abuse and misuse of securities class action 
lawsuits where defendant companies "choose to settle 
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rather than face the enormous expense of discovery and 
trial." S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), r eprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688. As the Senate Report states: 
 
        The fact that many of these lawsuits arefiled as 
       class actions has had an in terrorem ef fect on 
       Corporate America. A whole stable of "professional 
       plaintiffs," who own shares--or sometimes fractions of 
       shares--in many companies, stand ready to lend their 
       names to class action complaints. 
 
       * * * 
 
        The "victims" on whose behalf these lawsuits are 
       allegedly brought often receive only pennies on the 
       dollar in damages. Even worse, long-term investors 
       ultimately end up paying the costs associated with the 
       lawsuits. As the Council for Institutional Investors 
       advised: "We are * * * hurt if a system allows someone 
       to force us to spend huge sums of money in legal costs 
       by merely paying ten dollars and filing a meritless 
       cookie cutter complaint against a company or its 
       accountants when that plaintiff is disappointed in his 
       or her investment." 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 
MedSystems stands in contrast to the professional 
plaintiffs who were the focus of the statute. MedSystems 
invested the substantial sum of $1.4 million in EchoCath. 
It did so on the basis of personal repr esentations by 
EchoCath executives to MedSystems officers concer ning 
negotiations that had occurred and the imminent results 
expected of those negotiations. MedSystems' complaint is 
not a "cookie cutter complaint" or a class action brought by 
shareholders with an insignificant inter est in the company; 
it is an individual action, based on a transaction arising 
from direct negotiations between the parties to the action. 
 
It is difficult to see how MedSystems could have pled 
fraud or scienter with more specificity without having been 
given the opportunity to conduct any discovery. Her e, the 
necessary information as to the status of EchoCath's 
negotiations with the four companies lies in the defendant's 
hands. In cases prior to the Reform Act, we noted that the 
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pleading standard required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) could be 
relaxed "when factual information is peculiarly within the 
defendant's knowledge or control." Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. 
Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir . 1990); see also 
Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 285 (r eversing the dismissal of the 
complaint and granting the plaintiff an opportunity to state 
in the complaint that the necessary information is held by 
the defendant). We acknowledge the Refor m Act's 
heightened pleading requirement for the defendant's state 
of mind, but we believe that MedSystems' allegations are 
sufficient under the particular facts of this case, which is 
not the typical class action that Congress intended to 
target. 
 
In analyzing the effect of the Reform Act on pleading 
scienter, the Second Circuit concluded that the Reform Act 
"effectively raised the nationwide pleading standard to that 
previously existing in this circuit and no higher (with the 
exception of the `with particularity' requir ement)." Novak v. 
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir . 2000). In In re Advanta 
Corp. Sec. Litig., we noted that Congress essentially adopted 
the Second Circuit's interpretation. See 180 F.3d at 584. 
This court's earlier requirement for pleading scienter did 
not differ materially from that of the Second Circuit. See In 
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1418. 
MedSystems has conceded that it does not have 
information as to the status of the EchoCath negotiations 
with the four companies, if indeed there wer e negotiations, 
as it has not had the opportunity to acquire such 
information. We conclude that will suffice under the Reform 
Act. 
 
The District Court also found that the cautionary 
language in the January 1996 Prospectus and EchoCath's 
Operating Model eviscerated any inference of the requisite 
intent to commit fraud. However, as we commented earlier, 
cautionary language in the publicly disseminated 
Prospectus in January 1996 hardly negates any possible 
inference of fraud as to personal statements made from 
August 1996 to February 1997. There is no suggestion that 
EchoCath ever cautioned MedSystems before it made its 
investment in February 1997 that there was a change in 
the status of its four "imminent" contracts. Under these 
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circumstances, we believe that the scienter pleading 






It is undisputed that a plaintiff seeking r elief under Rule 
10b-5 must show reasonable reliance on a false statement 
or omission of material fact. See Kline, 24 F.3d at 487-88. 
MedSystems' complaint alleges that its executives believed 
the "representations concerning EchoCath's line of women's 
health products were true and would not have made its 
substantial investment in EchoCath if it had known these 
representations were false." Amended Complaint P 16. The 
District Court treated the imminent contracts 
representation as involving future pr edictions by EchoCath 
that contained no guarantee that the contracts would be 
consummated. The court repeated its position that the 
representation was contradicted by disclaimers and 
cautionary language in the 1996 Prospectus, the Annual 
Report, and the Quarterly Report filed with the SEC. See EP 
MedSystems, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 758. Thus, the court found 
that any reliance by MedSystems on the r epresentation was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. 
 
Our consideration of the District Court's analysis leads 
us to a conclusion similar to that we reached in our 
discussion on materiality where we concluded that none of 
the documents containing cautionary language sufficiently 
neutralized the materiality of the imminent contracts 
representation. It follows that reliance on the repeated oral 
representations by EchoCath's CEO was not unreasonable 
as a matter of law because of those documents. 
 
In Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d 
Cir. 1976), we identified a variety of factors that should be 
considered in determining whether the plaintiff 's reliance 
was reasonable. These factors include the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship, plaintiff 's opportunity to detect the 
fraud, the sophistication of the plaintiff, the existence of 
long-standing business or personal relationships, and 
access to the relevant information. See id. EchoCath argues 
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that MedSystems was a very sophisticated investor and 
that it should have taken more care to per form due 
diligence before it signed the subscription agr eement. But, 
as we noted in Straub, "a sophisticated investor is not 
barred by reliance upon the honesty of those with whom he 
deals in the absence of knowledge that the trust is 
misplaced. Integrity is still the mainstay of commer ce . . . ." 
Id. 
 
Nor did MedSystems have access to information that 
would have suggested that the imminent contracts 
representation was false. Whether MedSystems, after being 
told by EchoCath's CEO for the second time that contracts 
with four companies were imminent, should have 
approached one or more of the four companies and asked 
for a verification of the present state of negotiations is an 
issue for the trier of fact, not for a judge ruling on the 
sufficiency of the pleadings. We cannot say that 
MedSystems' reliance on the imminent contracts 






Finally, we turn to EchoCath's contention that dismissal 
was appropriate because the complaint fails to plead loss 
causation. The Reform Act provides that in a securities law 
action, "the plaintiff shall have the bur den of proving that 
the act or omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss for 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages." 15 U.S.C.A. 
S 78u-4(b)(4) (West Supp. 2000). Although this provision 
does not deal with pleading, the District Court, describing 
loss causation as the "causal link between the alleged 
misrepresentations and the harm incurred when a security 
is purchased and sold," EP MedSystems , 30 F. Supp. 2d at 
770 (quotation omitted), concluded that MedSystems failed 
to plead loss causation. The court stated that the plaintiff 
must show that the misrepresentations"caused the decline 
in value rather than merely inducing the transaction," id. 
(quotation omitted), and noted that MedSystems did not 
allege that the value of its investment has declined, but 
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rather "that it has `sustained substantialfinancial losses' 
as a direct result of the fraudulent misr epresentations [by 
EchoCath]." Id. at 771 (quoting Amended Complaint P 34). 
 
Before our recent decision in Semer enko v. Cendant 
Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000), we generally stated that 
the "misrepresentation must touch upon the reasons for 
the investment's decline in value." In r e Phillips Petroleum 
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir . 1989) (citing 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F .2d 534, 549 (5th 
Cir. 1981)). In Semerenko, we equated loss causation with 
proximate cause, stating that there must be a "sufficient 
causal nexus between the loss and the alleged 
misrepresentation." 223 F.3d at 184. The plaintiff class in 
Semerenko, which is representative of the usual securities 
case, alleged that it purchased shares at a price that was 
inflated due to misrepresentations by several directors and 
officers and that when the truth was made known, the 
price dropped to its true value. See id.  at 185. 
 
The complaint in Semerenko stated: 
 
       [T]he misrepresentations . . . dir ectly or proximately 
       caused, or were a substantial contributing cause of, 
       the damages sustained by plaintiff and the other 
       members of the Class. The misstatements . . . had the 
       effect of creating in the market an unr ealistically 
       positive assessment of Cendant, as well as of its 
       financial condition, causing ABI's common stock to be 
       overvalued and artificially inflated at all r elevant times. 
 
223 F.3d at 186. 
 
The defendants argued that the plaintif f class did not 
adequately plead loss causation, but we rejected that 
argument. Drawing all reasonable infer ences in a light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, we found that an allegation that the 
misrepresentations "directly or pr oximately caused, or were 
a substantial contributing cause of, the damages sustained 
by plaintiff " adequately pled loss causation. Id. Semerenko, 
which was issued after the District Court decided this case, 
adopted a practical approach, in effect applying general 
causation principles. 
 
Some of the other courts of appeals have also adopted a 
practical view of loss causation. For example, the Eighth 
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Circuit has stated that "[p]laintif fs are not required to meet 
a strict test of direct causation under Rule 10b-5; they need 
only show some causal nexus between [the defendant's] 
improper conduct and plaintiff 's losses." In re Control Data 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(quotation omitted). The Second Circuit similarly held that 
loss causation "embodies notions of the common law tort 
concept of proximate causation." AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst 
and Young, 206 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation 
omitted). In Ambassador Hotel Co., Ltd. v. W ei-Chuan 
Investment, 189 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir . 1999), the Ninth 
Circuit stated that "the loss causation r equirement limits 
the ability of plaintiffs to recover for losses sustained on the 
basis of factors unrelated to any misrepr esentation or 
fraud." As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Robbins v. Koger 
Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997), "the 
loss causation requirement must be applied on a case-by- 
case basis." 
 
In considering loss causation, it is important to r ecognize 
once again how this case differs from the usual securities 
action. In the usual securities action, plaintif fs complain 
because some announcement emanating from the 
company, whether regarding a tender of fer, see Semerenko, 
223 F.3d at 169, earnings, see In r e Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1416, pr ojected earnings, see 
Weiner, 129 F.3d at 312, or the company's financial 
condition, see In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d at 701, 
fraudulently represented the actual state of affairs. 
Plaintiffs claim that, as a result, they purchased the 
securities at a price that was artificially inflated, only to 
suffer a loss when the true situation was made known. See, 
e.g., Hayes v. Gross, 982 F .2d 104, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(involving a claim that defendants knowingly or r ecklessly 
misrepresented the company's financial condition, thus 
artificially inflating the stock price). 
 
This case differs. In this case, MedSystems claims that as 
a result of fraudulent misrepresentations made in personal 
communications by EchoCath executives, it was induced to 
make an investment of $1.4 million which tur ned out to be 
worthless.7 None of the cases in this circuit is analogous, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. While the complaint may not have set forth that damage theory with 
specificity, MedSystems' counsel clarified its damage theory at the oral 
argument. 
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and counsel have not referred us to a similar case in 
another circuit nor have we found one. It follows that 
although we take guidance from the language in other 
cases enunciating general principles, the holdings are to 
some extent inapplicable here. 
 
The causation issue becomes most critical at the pr oof 
stage. Whether the plaintiff has proven causation is usually 
reserved for the trier of fact. See, e.g. , Huddleston, 640 F.2d 
at 549-50 (reversing for failure to submit causation to the 
jury). MedSystems' complaint was dismissed at the pleading 
stage. Although, as noted above, the allegation that it 
"sustained substantial financial losses as a direct result of 
the aforementioned misrepresentations and omissions on 
the part of EchoCath" could have more specifically 
connected the misrepresentation to the alleged loss, i.e., 
investment in a company with little prospects, when we 
draw all reasonable inferences in plaintif f 's favor, we 







The District Court, in its scholarly opinion leading to its 
conclusion to dismiss MedSystems' complaint in its entirety 
as a matter of law, applied the law of the cir cuit as to some 
of the requirements of a securities action too restrictively. 
While Congress and some judicial decisions have tended to 
cabin the large securities class actions that may have been 
filed without adequate basis, some of the District Court's 
conclusions do not withstand our analysis. W e are informed 
by more recent precedent of this court that was not 
available to the District Court. Moreover , the District Court 
failed to recognize that this complaint by MedSystems does 
not fall into the pattern of the usual securities action and 
that application of certain legal requir ements must be 
adjusted to fit the particular action. 
 
Specifically, we have concluded that MedSystems' central 
allegation, that EchoCath's CEO gave MedSystems 
executives assurances that, after lengthy negotiations, 
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contracts with four identified companies wer e "imminent" 
and provided sales projections that wer e an integral part of 
these assurances, should not have been dismissed. This 
was a statement of fact in the context in which pr esented 
by MedSystems' complaint that could be found to meet the 
requirement of materiality. The allegation that EchoCath 
knew or had reason to know that this was not the case 
adequately met the requirement of pleading scienter. A trier 
of fact could find that reliance was r easonable and that 
there was the requisite causal connection between the 
assurances and MedSystems' loss, i.e., its investment. 
 
On the other hand, we have concluded that the District 
Court did not err in dismissing the allegations as to certain 
other expected income and anticipated sufficiency of funds 
because there was qualifying language that should have 
put a reasonable investor on notice of the risk. It follows 
that we will reverse the dismissal of the complaint, and also 
direct reinstatement of the state fraud count. 
 
In remanding to the District Court we do not suggest that 
it is obliged now to permit a wide ranging discovery effort 
by plaintiff. We have been influenced to some extent by 
MedSystems' counsel's statements that limited discovery 
into the facts surrounding the central allegation should 
disclose in short order whether there was an adequate 
basis in fact for the assurances given from August 1996 
through February 1997. If there is some evidence that there 
was inadequate basis for such assurances, then, of course, 
it becomes an issue for the jury. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the order 
dismissing the complaint and remand for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Each party to 
bear its own costs. 
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